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NOTES 
BACK TO THE FUTURE: 
PERMITTING HABEAS PETITIONS BASED 
ON INTERVENING RETROACTIVE CASE LAW 
TO ALTER CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES 
Lauren Casale* 
 
In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which authorizes a motion 
for federal prisoners to “vacate, set aside or correct” their sentences, with 
the goal of improving judicial efficiency in collateral review.  Section 
2255(e), known as the “savings clause,” allows federal inmates to challenge 
the validity of their imprisonments with writs of habeas corpus if § 2255 
motions are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] 
detention[s].”  Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s and Congress’s silence 
regarding what suffices as “inadequate or ineffective,” the circuit courts 
have adopted varied standards. 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits hold that prisoners can use the savings 
clause to challenge their convictions or sentences based on new retroactive 
case law.  On the other hand, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits prejudice 
prisoners by prohibiting them from challenging their convictions or 
sentences based on new case law.  Recently, the Fourth Circuit expanded the 
circuit split by agreeing with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in United States 
v. Wheeler.  A petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler is currently pending 
before the Supreme Court.  This Note examines the circuits’ different 
standards and contends that the circuits that foreclose savings clause 
challenges impermissibly curtail prisoners’ rights.  Further, this Note argues 
that the Supreme Court must define the scope of the savings clause to permit 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, Charles “Gary” Bruce and Robert Bruce’s 
interactions with the criminal justice system appeared virtually identical.1  
The Bruce brothers have more in common than their genes; they also share 
the same criminal convictions stemming from the crimes they jointly 
committed.2  In the 1990s, the Western District of Tennessee imposed 
indistinguishable sentences on Robert and Gary.3  Nevertheless, their 
criminal fates finally diverged in 2016 and 2017 due to conflicting 
interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).4 
Overall, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 empowers federal prisoners to file motions “to 
vacate, set aside, or correct” their sentences.5  Section 2255(e), known as the 
“savings clause,” creates a pathway for prisoners to challenge their 
incarcerations.6  If inmates show that a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention[s],” the savings clause 
allows them to bring a § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.7  Congress 
originally enacted this provision to promote judicial efficiency.8  However, a 
clash among the circuits regarding what qualifies as “inadequate or 
ineffective” has transformed this statute into a prisoners’ rights dilemma.9  
This Note focuses on the circuit split’s ramifications for inmates, who may 
be denied a chance to challenge their detentions solely because of the 
inopportune location of their prisons.10  Comparing the Bruce brothers 
highlights this conflict’s arbitrariness. 
In January 1991, Gary and Robert Bruce, along with another brother and 
a friend, killed two people and burned the victims’ bodies and home.11  A 
 
 1. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 3, McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) 
(No. 17-85), 2017 WL 5508928, at *3. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Compare Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that the Western 
District of Tennessee sentenced Gary to life without parole plus ten years), with Bruce v. 
Warden, 658 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (noting that the Western District 
of Tennessee sentenced Robert to life in prison and ten years), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 683 
(2017). 
 4. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180. 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). 
 6. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 174. 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774 (2008). 
 8. See infra notes 225–27 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 11. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 175.  Gary and Robert Bruce plotted to rob Danny Vine, the 
operator of a nearby mussel shell camp, along with their brother, Jerry Bruce, and a friend, 
David Riales.  After restraining Vine and his fiancée, Della Thornton, Gary and Jerry Bruce 
shot them.  Once they completed the murders and arson, they fled the scene with stolen 
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grand jury indicted each of the four men involved on eight counts,12 one of 
which was witness-tampering murder.13  In 1995, Robert Bruce, his other 
brother Jerry Bruce, and friend David Riales were tried in the Western 
District of Tennessee.14  Gary Bruce, however, escaped from jail in July 1994 
and remained on the run for fourteen months.15  Thus, Gary’s 1998 trial was 
severed from that of his coconspirators.16  Nevertheless, Robert and Gary 
Bruce were each convicted on all counts and each received a life sentence 
with an additional ten-year term.17 
After being convicted, Gary and Robert Bruce attempted to obtain 
postconviction relief multiple times.18  Their efforts were unsuccessful until 
they sought to invoke a 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision,19 Fowler v. 
United States.20  The Fowler decision clarified the government’s burden of 
proof for federal witness-tampering murder,21 of which both Gary and Robert 
had been convicted.22  Relying on the savings clause, the Bruce brothers filed 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge their 
detentions.23  They argued that their habeas petitions were appropriate 
because the intervening Fowler decision rendered other forms of relief under 
§ 2255 “inadequate or ineffective.”24  The Bruces claimed that they were 
 
mussels.  Days later, local police discovered the burned corpses of Vine, Thornton, and their 
dog. Id. 
 12. Id. at 176.  Ultimately, investigators connected them with the crime after learning that 
Gary’s wife and brothers sold questionable mussel shells. Id. at 175. 
 13. A person has committed witness-tampering murder if he or she “kills or attempts to 
kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or 
possible commission of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (2012); see also Bruce, 
868 F.3d at 181. 
 14. United States v. Bruce, Nos. 95-6046 to 95-6049, 1996 WL 640468, at *1 (6th Cir. 
Nov. 5, 1996).  Robert and Jerry Bruce, as well as Riales, were convicted on all the charges. 
Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176. 
 15. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. at 176; Bruce v. Warden, 658 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) 
(noting that Robert’s sentence was life in prison and ten years), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 683 
(2017).  Despite Gary Bruce’s additional jailbreak offense, he received the same sentence. See 
Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176. 
 18. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176 (noting that Gary Bruce previously filed a § 2255 motion 
in 2011 and tried to obtain permission to file two additional § 2255 motions in 2012 and 2013, 
which were denied); Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937 (stating that Robert Bruce previously filed a 
§ 2255 motion, which a Tennessee district court denied in 1998, and attempted to file 
additional § 2255 motions in 2003 and 2005, which were also denied). 
 19. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 183; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38. 
 20. 563 U.S. 668 (2011). 
 21. Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38 (quoting Fowler, 563 U.S. at 677–78) (explaining that 
Fowler requires the government to show that a person killed another with “intent to prevent 
communications with federal law enforcement officers,” which is satisfied “only if it is 
reasonably likely under the circumstances that (in the absence of the killing) at least one of 
the relevant communications would have been made to a federal officer”). 
 22. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176. 
 23. Id. at 177; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937. 
 24. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176–77; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38 (describing that the 
crux of the Bruces’ petitions was the court’s jury instructions at trial, which did not include a 
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innocent of witness-tampering murder because the conduct for which they 
were convicted did not meet the requisite burden of proof under Fowler.25  
Because Robert and Gary were imprisoned in different circuits, they were 
forced to file their habeas petitions in different courts.26  This difference 
subjected the petitions to markedly different judicial treatment, simply due 
to the circuits’ contradictory readings of the savings clause.27 
The Eleventh Circuit, where Robert Bruce was incarcerated, rejected his 
claim.28  That court found that Robert was not foreclosed from raising a 
Fowler-esque argument on direct appeal or in his first § 2255 motion.29  
Accordingly, Robert Bruce did not satisfy the savings clause and lacked 
jurisdiction to file his petition.30  Conversely, the Third Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion by relying on its prior holding that prisoners may use the 
savings clause whenever a new, intervening, and substantive law may make 
them innocent.31  Thus, the Third Circuit allowed Gary’s claim to proceed 
and considered the merits of his actual-innocence argument.32 
Juxtaposing the Bruce brothers’ disparate treatment highlights the inequity 
that the savings clause circuit split poses for inmates based simply on a 
prison’s location.33  Although Gary Bruce did not ultimately prevail on his 
petition, the key difference is that he received an opportunity that his brother 
was denied.34  If the Third Circuit had found that Gary demonstrated that he 
was actually innocent of witness-tampering murder, he would have obtained 
full habeas relief.35  In this scenario, Gary would have successfully shown 
that he was unlawfully imprisoned for witness-tampering murder, and the 
court would have thrown out his conviction on that charge.36  In contrast, 
Robert Bruce’s conviction for witness-tampering murder would have 
 
reasonable likeliness standard nor specify that federal law enforcement officers must be 
implicated). 
 25. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 174; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38. 
 26. See infra notes 66, 215–18 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Bureau 
of Prisons’s authority to determine where an inmate is incarcerated and the jurisdictional 
requirement that prisoners file habeas petitions in the district where they are imprisoned. 
 27. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180. 
 28. Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 940. 
 29. Id. (determining that, earlier, Robert Bruce had a “genuine opportunity” to challenge 
his conviction). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180–81. 
 32. Id. at 181. 
 33. See id. at 181–82. 
 34. See id. at 183, 188–89 (finding that Gary Bruce’s habeas petition was unsuccessful 
because he did not meet the standard of showing that “any reasonable juror faced with ‘all the 
evidence,’ . . . would conclude that, had [the victims] survived, the likelihood that they would 
have communicated with a federal officer was more than remote, outlandish, or simply 
hypothetical,” and that “[i]t therefore follows that any reasonable juror would convict Bruce 
of witness tampering murder”). 
 35. See id. at 184. 
 36. See id. at 182–84 (stating that courts have “no authority to leave in place a conviction 
or sentence that violates a substantive rule”). 
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remained, and he would still be incarcerated on all charges.37  Both Gary and 
Robert Bruce acted in conjunction to commit the same crimes and received 
equal punishments.38  Yet, only Gary, who arguably was even more culpable 
because he escaped from prison, could challenge his incarceration.39 
Critically, the circuit split on the savings clause’s scope is not limited to 
the tests espoused by the Third and Eleventh Circuits.40  Besides disagreeing 
over the availability of savings clause petitions to dispute an underlying 
conviction, other circuits also allow savings clause relief for sentencing 
defects.41  Though questions regarding the savings clause’s reach are not 
new,42 this dilemma came to the forefront once again with a March 2018 
decision that widened the circuit split, United States v. Wheeler.43  In 
Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit expanded its interpretation of the savings clause 
to allow prisoners to dispute their sentences, in addition to their 
convictions.44  Characterized as an “entrenched conflict” in the government’s 
October 2018 petition for a writ of certiorari,45 the savings clause controversy 
highlights the particularly grave implications of this unsettled legal 
question.46 
Part I of this Note provides background information about the writ of 
habeas corpus and the savings clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  Next, Part II 
describes the conflicting interpretations of the savings clause.  Part III then 
asserts that the Supreme Court must conclusively define the savings clause 
to lessen arbitrariness, improve judicial and legal efficiency, and address this 
recurring and fundamental prisoners’ rights issue.  Finally, Part IV proposes 
that the Supreme Court should permit savings clause relief for inmates 
relying on intervening retroactive case law to challenge their convictions or 
sentences. 
 
 37. See id. at 180 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit did not believe that Robert Bruce 
was entitled to invoke the savings clause to challenge his witness-tampering murder 
conviction under § 2241). 
 38. See supra notes 1–3, 17–19 and accompanying text. 
 39. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23–24, United States v. Wheeler, No. 18-420 
(U.S. Oct. 3, 2018) (stating that “[t]he courts of appeal are divided” and noting that even those 
circuits permitting some savings clause relief “have offered varying rationales and have 
adopted somewhat different formulations”). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2016); 
Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 42. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) 
(No. 17-85), 2017 WL 3034223, at *13 (stating that this issue “cries out for the Court’s 
intervention” and that “[t]he arguments on both sides of the conflict are well developed, with 
the benefit of numerous opinions across nearly every regional circuit over the last two 
decades”). 
 43. 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018). 
 44. See id. at 428–29. 
 45. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 23. 
 46. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893–94 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) 
(Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
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I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS 
A FORM OF COLLATERAL REVIEW 
This Part explores the development of the writ of habeas corpus, which 
affords inmates an additional opportunity for judicial relief beyond the direct 
appeals process.  Part I.A briefly describes the origins of habeas corpus and 
its early application in the American criminal justice system.  Part I.B 
provides an overview of current habeas law in the United States, including 
the current statutory framework for this form of collateral review. 
A.  The Greatness of the “Great Writ”:  A Brief History of Habeas Corpus 
as a Crucial Safeguard for Prisoners 
Collateral review is a way for courts to indirectly examine a decision apart 
from a direct appeal.47  Examples of collateral proceedings include writs of 
habeas corpus48 and motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence.49  
Habeas corpus, which means “that you have the body” in Latin,50 is a 
procedural tool that allows courts to evaluate whether a prisoner’s detention 
is legally authorized.51  This legal recourse dates back to English common 
law, where it was termed the “Great Writ.”52  Some have opined that the 
availability of habeas corpus is the most fundamental human right.53 
The American Founding Fathers similarly deemed habeas corpus to be the 
“ultimate weapon” in the citizenry’s arsenal to guard their individual rights 
against intrusion by the federal government.54  Consequently, the Suspension 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution explicitly protects habeas corpus during times 
of peace.55  When the states ratified the Constitution, the Suspension Clause 
was understood to confer an affirmative right on all federal detainees to have 
 
 47. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 551–53 (2011) (defining collateral review as “a judicial 
reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 230 n.14 (1960) (remarking that “there are 
a number of collateral remedies available to redress denial of basic rights”). 
 50. Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Jeffrey Toobin, 
Killing Habeas Corpus, NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2006/12/04/killing-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/7XLY-HF8M]. 
 51. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS:  RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 
1 (2001); NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  
USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 4 (2011); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL 
COURTS:  HABEAS CORPUS 85 (2d ed. 2010). 
 52. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at vii, 2–3. 
 53. DAVID CLARK & GERARD MCCOY, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT:  HABEAS 
CORPUS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 3–4 (2000) (observing that incarcerated individuals’ “ability 
to exercise all other human rights is either severely restricted or virtually non-existent”). 
 54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)  
(commenting that the writ of habeas corpus, along with the constitutional ban on ex post facto 
laws and noble titles, may be the greatest constitutional “securities to liberty and 
republicanism”); KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at 3. 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); 
see also KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at 3. 
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a court scrutinize the legality of their confinements.56  Habeas relief is so 
crucial that Congress cannot suspend it except when necessary to protect the 
country’s safety.57  After the Civil War, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1867, which allowed federal courts to also evaluate the validity of 
state prisoners’ detentions.58 
B.  Modern Habeas Relief 
Federal prisoners may seek habeas relief through two avenues59:  a 
traditional habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 224160 or a motion under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255.61  This section discusses the modern statutory framework 
for habeas corpus, analyzes more recent changes to habeas relief, and 
considers the savings clause, which links § 2241 and § 2255. 
1.  Two Bodies of Review:  § 2241 and § 2255 Frameworks 
Prisoners challenging their sentences may seek collateral relief through 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255.62  Congress initially enacted both 
statutes in 194863 as responses to difficulties with the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867, which allowed more prisoners to file petitions.64 
Federal detainees may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge their convictions or sentences.65  A prisoner 
must bring a § 2241 petition in the district where he or she is imprisoned.66  
 
 56. See 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881) (conveying the New York 
ratifying convention’s belief that anyone who is “restrained of his liberty is entitled to an 
inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful”); see also 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008). 
 57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 58. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at 9. 
 59. Federal Habeas Corpus, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-37000-
federal-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/9DHW-3YDS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2012). 
 61. Id. § 2255(a); see also YACKLE, supra note 51, at 86 (observing that “in 1948 Congress 
largely eliminated the ability of federal convicts to attack their . . . sentences under § 2241 and 
substituted a [§ 2255] motion procedure to perform the same function”). 
 62. Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 59. 
 63. Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of 
Innocence:  A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals 
Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 81 
(2005). 
 64. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774–75 (2008); Nicholas Matteson, Note, 
Feeling Inadequate?:  The Struggle to Define the Savings Clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 54 B.C. 
L. REV. 353, 358–59 (2011) (observing that the 1867 act “resulted in habeas petitions 
disproportionately clogging the dockets of those federal courts” because it required prisoners 
to file habeas petitions in the district where they are confined and allowed state prisoners to 
file habeas petitions); see also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608–09 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
 66. Protocol for the Effective Handling of Collateral Attacks on Convictions Brought 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-
manual-745-introduction-federal-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/7TRS-P629] (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2019) (noting that this imposes a heavy burden on districts that house more prisoners 
and causes judges “wholly unfamiliar with the prosecution” to consider the petition). 
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Section 2241 petitions focus on the implementation of a prisoner’s 
sentence.67  For example, an inmate may use a § 2241 habeas petition to 
challenge “the administration of his parole, computation of his sentence by 
parole officials, disciplinary actions taken against him, the type of detention, 
and prison conditions in the facility where he is incarcerated.”68  As discussed 
in Part I.B.3, the ability of federal prisoners to bring petitions under this 
provision is very limited. 
Federal prisoners may also file a motion to “vacate, set aside or correct [a] 
sentence” under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.69  This provision does not apply to 
inmates in state custody,70 who instead must avail themselves of traditional 
§ 2241 habeas petitions.71  A federal inmate may use a § 2255 motion to 
dispute the “imposition of his sentence.”72  In such a challenge, a petitioner 
may argue that a sentence:  (1) is unconstitutional or violates federal law; 
(2) was imposed by a court that lacked jurisdiction; (3) exceeds the statutory 
maximum; or (4) is otherwise subject to a collateral challenge.73  These 
motions are federal inmates’ initial, and often sole, method of collateral 
attack.74 
Prisoners did not have access to these motions until Congress enacted 
§ 2255 in 1948.75  Congress intended § 2255 to solve the issue of “habeas 
petitions disproportionately clogging the dockets of those federal courts with 
federal prisons within their territorial jurisdiction.”76  Consequently, the 
statute departs from § 2241 in some respects.  One significant distinction is 
that federal inmates must bring § 2255 motions in the district court that 
initially sentenced them rather than in the district where they are 
imprisoned.77 
Moreover, § 2255 largely prohibits federal prisoners from seeking relief 
with § 2241 habeas petitions.78  Section 2255 declares that if prisoners 
eligible to bring § 2255 motions fail to file them or if courts have already 
rejected them, their writs of habeas corpus “shall not be entertained.”79  
 
 67. See Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 68. Id. 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
 70. Matteson, supra note 64, at 359 (stating that § 2255 is a procedure created for federal 
prisoners); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (entitled “Federal Custody”). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (referring to a habeas petition “made by a person in custody under 
the judgment and sentence of a State court” (emphasis added)). 
 72. Adams, 372 F.3d at 135. 
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
 74. See Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 75. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of the Petitioner at 3, 
McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) (No. 17-85), 2017 WL 3531410, at *3 
[hereinafter Constitution Project Brief]. 
 76. Matteson, supra note 64, at 358 (emphasis added); see United States v. Hayman, 342 
U.S. 205, 214 n.18 (1952) (observing that when § 2255 was passed over 60 percent of habeas 
petitions were filed in just five courts); see also Constitution Project Brief, supra note 75, at 
3. 
 77. Matteson, supra note 64, at 359. 
 78. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
 79. Id. 
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However, if federal inmates are able to satisfy an exception codified in 
§ 2255(e), courts may consider their habeas petitions.80 
2.  Restrictive Amendments to Habeas Relief 
Congress further restricted habeas petitions with the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).81  In doing so, Congress 
intended to “curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus.”82  The 
AEDPA added requirements for habeas relief to continue § 2255’s original 
purpose of bolstering, not weakening, collateral relief.83  Nevertheless, courts 
have grappled with the AEDPA’s revisions since its enactment.84  These 
changes have elicited strong responses, such as that of Professor Anthony G. 
Amsterdam of NYU School of Law, who called the AEDPA an “atomic 
bomb . . . on the federal judiciary, [which] shatter[ed] the preexisting 
structure of habeas corpus law.”85 
Notable AEDPA amendments to § 2255 include a one-year statute of 
limitations86 and a ban on successive motions unless a federal circuit court 
approves them.87  The proscription on successive motions only permits a 
prisoner to bring a second or consecutive § 2255 motion if a circuit court 
certifies that it either:  (1) includes newfound evidence demonstrating a 
prisoner’s innocence, or (2) focuses on a new interpretation of constitutional 
law that the Supreme Court deemed retroactive.88  These constraints on 
motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence are codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h).89  Nevertheless, the limits on second or successive habeas 
 
 80. See id.  This clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), is the primary focus of this paper. See infra 
Part I.B.3 for further analysis. 
 81. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 110; Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus 
Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 381 (1996). 
 82. H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  But see Stephen R. Reinhardt, 
The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity:  The Court’s Ever 
Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and 
Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2015) 
(contending that the AEDPA was “misconceived at its inception and born of misguided 
political ambition”). 
 83. See Boumediene v. Bush, 554 U.S. 723, 776 (2008). 
 84. See Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER (June 21, 
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights 
[https://perma.cc/JTM4-QA4D] (noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted the AEDPA 
in approximately seventy cases). 
 85. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreword to 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at v, v (7th ed. 2018); see also Caplan, supra note 
84 (remarking that the AEDPA “gutted the federal writ of habeas corpus”). 
 86. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012); see also Matteson, supra note 64, at 361; Note, 
Suspended Justice:  The Case Against 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s Statute of Limitations, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1090, 1096–97 (2016). 
 87. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B). 
 88. Matteson, supra note 64, at 361. 
 89. 28 U.S.C § 2255(h). 
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petitions are consistent with common-law principles.90  These modifications 
are a modern codification of common-law limits to prevent “abuse of the 
writ.”91 
Furthermore, § 2255 recognizes a distinction between constitutional and 
statutory decisions.  To bring a § 2255 motion for a new constitutional 
decision, “an inmate can only assert a claim anchored upon a new Supreme 
Court ruling within one year of that ruling, so long as that ruling is 
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”92  In 2001, the 
Supreme Court clarified the standard for retroactivity in Tyler v. Cain.93  The 
Tyler decision explained that petitioners only satisfy the stringent 
retroactivity standard if the Supreme Court applies a rule on collateral review 
or issues further holdings making the rule retroactive.94  In practice, these 
“austere retroactivity provisions”95 prevent lower courts from using a rule 
that would render a prisoner’s conviction or sentence illegal solely because 
the Supreme Court has not yet made it retroactive.96  This Note, however, 
focuses on new statutory decisions, which petitioners can raise in savings 
clause claims. 
3.  The Savings Clause 
The restrictions on § 2255 motions discussed in Part I.B.2 do not apply to 
§ 2241 petitions, which renders these petitions more appealing to inmates 
trying to bring collateral challenges.97  Federal prisoners may file habeas 
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if they:  (1) are challenging the 
execution of their sentences,98 or (2) satisfy the exception in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(e), known as the savings clause.99  Otherwise, courts lack jurisdiction 
 
 90. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723, 774 (2008) (stating that these provisions “did not constitute a substantial departure 
from common-law habeas procedures”). 
 91. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (considering the limits on second or successive petitions); see 
also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991) (defining “abuse” of the writ as “a complex 
and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, 
statutory developments, and judicial decisions”). 
 92. Thomas H. Gabay, Note, Using Johnson v. United States to Reframe Retroactivity for 
Second or Successive Collateral Challenges, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1623 (2016) (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)). 
 93. 553 U.S. 656, 663–64, 666 (2001); Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch and Johnson 
Resentencing (This Is Not a Joke), 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 67, 69 (2017). 
 94. Tyler, 553 U.S. at 663–64, 666; Litman, supra note 93, at 69. 
 95. Gabay, supra note 92, at 1624 (noting that this “significantly limit[s] the availability 
of collateral relief even on a colorable claim of a new rule”). 
 96. See Litman, supra note 93, at 69. 
 97. See id. at 68 (explaining that federal inmates prefer § 2241 petitions because 
“Congress imposed a litany of draconian conditions on prisoners’ ability to challenge their 
convictions under section 2255”). 
 98. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text; see also Federal Habeas Corpus, 
supra note 59 (providing an example of petitions alleging that the Bureau of Prisons 
miscalculated a sentence or that prison conditions were inadequate). 
 99. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); Federal Habeas Corpus, 
supra note 59. 
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to consider federal prisoners’ habeas petitions that challenge their 
convictions or sentences.100  The savings clause states that: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is 
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to [§ 2255], shall not be 
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by 
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him 
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.101 
Thus, § 2241 habeas petitions may only proceed under the savings clause 
where a § 2255 motion is deemed “inadequate or ineffective.”102  This clause 
provides a safety hatch that preserves habeas relief in limited circumstances 
rather than barring writs of habeas corpus for federal prisoners in most 
situations.103  By passing this provision, Congress preemptively avoided 
claims that it unconstitutionally suspended habeas corpus.104 
When Congress passed the savings clause, it rejected proposed language 
that would have been more restrictive.105  Today, the savings clause 
continues to present a challenge.106  Because the Supreme Court has not 
circumscribed the provision’s reach, this inquiry has been left to the lower 
courts, which are largely divided.107 
II.  A SPLIT IN THE SAVINGS CLAUSE:  DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS 
OF “INADEQUATE OR INEFFECTIVE” 
This Part examines what Fourth Circuit Judge Steven G. Agee 
characterized as the “deep and mature circuit split on the reach of the savings 
clause.”108  Part II.A describes the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ minority 
approach, which prohibits habeas relief through the savings clause for 
intervening retroactive changes in case law.  Part II.B covers the varied 
 
 100. Protocol for the Effective Handling of Collateral Attacks on Convictions Brought 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, supra note 66 (observing that most § 2241 habeas petitions are 
jurisdictionally defective because prisoners could bring § 2255 challenges for these claims). 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). 
 102. Id.; see also YACKLE, supra note 51, at 86–87. 
 103. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 104. Id.; see supra notes 54–57 (discussing the importance of the writ of habeas corpus to 
the American constitutional order). 
 105. See Jennifer L. Case, Text Me:  A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 
103 KY. L.J. 169, 178 (2014) (observing that the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas 
Corpus Procedure recommended another formulation of the savings clause, which 
“prohibit[ed] a prisoner from filing a § 2241 habeas petition unless it was not ‘practicable to 
determine his rights to discharge from custody on [a § 2255] motion because of his inability 
to be present at the hearing on such motion, or for other reasons’” (second alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 215 n.23 (1952))); see also infra 
Part III.C. 
 106. See Matteson, supra note 64, at 363. 
 107. See id.; infra Part II. 
 108. United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 894 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee, J., 
statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (quoting Bryant v. Warden, 738 
F.3d 1253, 1279 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled by McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-
Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017)). 
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approaches of the ten circuits that permit habeas petitions under the savings 
clause for retroactive changes in law.  This Part primarily focuses on the 
Third and Fifth, Sixth and Seventh, and Fourth Circuits’ interpretations of 
the savings clause. 
A.  The Minority Approach:  Prisoners May Never Challenge Their 
Convictions or Sentences Through the Savings Clause 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have the most restrictive view of the 
savings clause and almost entirely foreclose this provision as a means of 
relief.109  These circuits only allow savings clause habeas relief where 
“something about the initial § 2255 procedure . . . itself is inadequate or 
ineffective for testing a challenge to detention.”110  Under this standard, a 
new legal rule alone is not sufficient to warrant relief in the form of a § 2241 
petition.111  Instead, successful savings clause petitioners must demonstrate 
a weakness in the actual § 2255 court proceedings.112  Examples of the 
limited infirmities that are sufficient for savings clause relief include the 
dissolution of the sentencing court,113 “practical considerations,”114 or a 
challenge to the implementation of a sentence.115  The Tenth Circuit adopted 
this test in a 2011 opinion written by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch, Prost v. 
Anderson.116 
The Prost court justified its test on several grounds.117  First, Judge 
Gorsuch argued that the statute compels different meanings of the terms 
“remedy” and “relief.”118  A court not granting relief to a prisoner is different 
from the savings clause’s requirement that the “remedy by motion is 
inadequate or ineffective.”119  From this distinction, Judge Gorsuch deduced 
that so long as a prisoner had a chance to raise his or her claim, regardless of 
his or her success on the merits, he or she cannot bring a subsequent habeas 
 
 109. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 16–17 (discussing the circuit split 
and observing that “the Tenth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit . . . has categorically rejected 
the proposition that an intervening and retroactively applicable statutory-interpretation 
decision of this Court provides a basis for relief under Section 2255(e)” unlike the majority of 
circuit courts). 
 110. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 589 (10th Cir. 2011); see also McCarthan, 851 F.3d 
at 1080. 
 111. Prost, 636 F.3d at 589. 
 112. Id. 
 113. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1093 (explaining that for military prisoners, for example, 
court martial proceedings cease to exist after sentencing). 
 114. Id. (observing that this may occur if there is more than one sentencing court). 
 115. Id. at 1092–93 (describing challenges to parole decisions). 
 116. 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011).  Now a Supreme Court justice, Gorsuch could be 
an instrumental figure should the Supreme Court take up the savings clause debate. See 
Litman, supra note 93, at 67 (discussing Judge Gorsuch before President Trump appointed 
him to the Supreme Court and stating that Prost “provides a nice glimpse into how Judge 
Gorsuch might address matters that are reasonably susceptible to different resolution, as many 
of the Supreme Court’s cases are”). 
 117. Prost, 636 F.3d at 584–88. 
 118. Id. at 584–85. 
 119. Id. 
1590 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
petition under the savings clause.120  Second, the court determined that 
Congress was aware that prisoners could raise challenges based on new 
statutory interpretation rules.121  Congress’s ban on second or successive 
petitions in § 2255(h), however, would be pointless if courts read the savings 
clause expansively.122  Third, subsections (e), (f), and (h) of § 2255 focus on 
“providing a single opportunity to test arguments” rather than the success of 
such arguments.123  Consequently, § 2255(e) should be taken at face value 
and courts should only allow § 2241 petitions if the prisoner had no chance 
to raise his or her argument.124  Fourth, the savings clause was not intended 
to give prisoners “multiple bites at the apple.”125  Instead, Congress passed 
§ 2255 to address venue difficulties in habeas proceedings, not to change the 
scope of prisoners’ rights in seeking collateral relief.126 
The Eleventh Circuit followed in 2017 with McCarthan v. Director of 
Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc.127  In McCarthan, the Eleventh Circuit 
eschewed its former rule128 and credited the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation as 
the only one faithful to the statute.129  These circuits foreclose challenges 
premised on unfavorable circuit precedent at the time of the initial § 2255 
motion130—a common basis for savings clause relief in other circuits.131  The 
justification provided by these circuits is that petitioners may always contest 
adverse circuit case law in their initial § 2255 motions, which are “fully 
available and amply sufficient.”132  Drawing a comparison, Prost rationalizes 
that “a student’s failure to imagine a novel or creative answer to an exam 
 
 120. Id. at 585 (stating that the savings clause “emphasizes its concern with ensuring the 
prisoner an opportunity or chance to test his argument” and that “with this opportunity comes 
no guarantee about outcome or relief”). 
 121. Id. at 585–86. 
 122. See id. at 586. 
 123. Id. at 587. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 588. 
 126. Id. at 587–88. 
 127. 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017).  In this case, petitioner 
Daniel McCarthan sought to dispute his prison sentence stemming from a felon-in-possession 
charge.  McCarthan was originally sentenced as a “career offender” because of three earlier 
convictions.  However, an intervening retroactive decision held that one of McCarthan’s prior 
convictions did not count toward the career offender designation.  Accordingly, McCarthan 
argued that his sentence should be reviewed because the sentencing court relied on incorrect 
benchmarks. See id. at 1079–81; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 5–6; see 
also infra Part IV.D. 
 128. The Eleventh Circuit previously employed a five-prong test, which allowed for 
savings clause relief based on new precedent.  However, it only permitted relief in two cases 
using that former test. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080, 1096–99 (explaining that prior 
“precedents have failed to adhere to the text of section 2255(e), have not incurred significant 
reliance interests, and have proved unworkable, [thus] today we overrule them”). 
 129. See id. at 1080, 1085 (noting that “[w]e join the Tenth Circuit in applying the law as 
Congress wrote it” and avowing that “[o]nly the Tenth Circuit has adhered to—or even 
seriously considered—the text of the saving clause”). 
 130. See id. at 1086–87; Prost, 636 F.3d at 590. 
 131. See infra Part II.B for further discussion of the different majority interpretations. 
 132. Prost, 636 F.3d at 589–90 (observing that the petitioner’s entire argument was based 
on the improbability of success if he challenged circuit precedent because “he was entirely 
free to raise and test” the law); McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1086. 
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question doesn’t make the exam an inadequate or ineffective procedure for 
testing his knowledge.”133  Accordingly, even if settled law squarely 
contradicts their position, petitioners and their lawyers are expected to 
brainstorm compelling challenges to precedent.134 
B.  The Majority Approach 
Ten circuits allow prisoners to bring § 2241 challenges through the savings 
clause under certain circumstances.135  On the whole, these circuits find that 
an intervening change in legal precedent makes other relief inadequate or 
ineffective under § 2255(e), albeit under different circumstances in different 
circuits.136  The circuits that follow the majority view have diverse rules for 
§ 2255(e) relief with significant implications for petitioners.137  A critical 
point of departure is that some circuits only permit savings clause relief to 
challenge the legitimacy of an underlying conviction, whereas others also 
permit relief to dispute the validity of a sentence.138 
As a threshold matter, in conviction or sentence disputes, petitioners 
seeking to use the savings clause must first demonstrate that they have 
exhausted all other opportunities for relief under § 2255.139  A petitioner 
could be successful, for example, by showing that he or she previously filed 
 
 133. Prost, 636 F.3d at 589. 
 134. See id.; see also Adam Liptak, Serving Extra Years in Prison, and the Courthouse 
Doors Are Closed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/ 
politics/trump-justice-department-prison-sentences.html [https://perma.cc/3K4P-VR3E]. 
 135. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017); Hill 
v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 594–95 (6th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th 
Cir. 2013); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring savings clause 
petitioners to (1) claim they are actually innocent, and (2) show that they have not had an 
unobstructed procedural opportunity to bring their challenge); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 
957, 960 (8th Cir. 2004) (using the same test as the Ninth Circuit); In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (failing to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s test or create its own test but relying 
on Seventh Circuit precedent for the idea that “§ 2255 ‘can fairly be termed inadequate when 
it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification 
of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent 
offense’” (quoting In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998))); Reyes-Requena v. 
United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring petitioners to allege they:  (1) are 
imprisoned for actions that are no longer criminal due to an intervening retroactive Supreme 
Court decision, and (2) have had no prior opportunity to dispute this conviction based on the 
intervening change); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 52 (1st Cir. 1999) (observing that 
savings clause relief is allowed in some instances but deciding that “it is not necessary in this 
case to articulate those circumstances precisely—we leave that task for another day”); 
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that savings clause 
claims are viable in “at the least, the set of cases in which the petitioner cannot, for whatever 
reason, utilize § 2255, and in which the failure to allow for collateral review would raise 
serious constitutional questions”). 
 136. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 23–24. 
 137. See infra Part III.A. 
 138. See infra Part II.B. 
 139. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 894–96 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) 
(Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing en banc) (noting that Wheeler lacked another 
way to bring a challenge because he previously filed a direct appeal and § 2255 motion); supra 
notes 87, 88–90 and accompanying text (discussing § 2255(h)’s ban on multiple motions). 
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a § 2255 motion on other grounds.140  Since § 2255(h) largely limits second 
or successive motions under that statute, the petitioner must show that he or 
she has no other vehicle for invoking new retroactive case law.141  
Significantly, since petitioners could already bring second or successive 
§ 2255 motions if the case law announces a new constitutional rule, they must 
also assert that the new precedent they are invoking is a statutory 
interpretation decision.142  These considerations apply in every circuit that 
allows some degree of savings clause relief.143 
Beyond these initial considerations, the circuits have set different limits on 
the reach of § 2255(e) relief.  First, Part II.B.1 examines the Third and Fifth 
Circuits’ standard, which permits prisoners to use intervening retroactive 
case law to challenge the validity of their underlying convictions but not the 
implementation of their sentences.144  Part II.B.2 next looks at the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits’ standard, which is distinct in permitting prisoners to rely 
on intervening retroactive case law to challenge the validity of their sentences 
in addition to their convictions.145  Finally, Part II.B.3 analyzes the recently 
extended Fourth Circuit rule, which also permits challenges to sentences 
through the savings clause.  The Fourth Circuit broadened its interpretation 
of the savings clause in March 2018, which is the basis of a petition for a writ 
of certiorari pending before the Supreme Court.  This section also discusses 
the intracircuit disagreement over the reach of the Fourth Circuit’s test. 
1.  Many Circuits Allow Prisoners to Challenge Their Underlying 
Convictions Through the Savings Clause 
Most circuits allow prisoners to use the savings clause to challenge their 
convictions.146  Of these majority approaches, the Third and Fifth Circuits 
rely on a stricter construction of the savings clause which requires that 
prisoners demonstrates their “actual innocence.”147  Under this theory, 
prisoners must (1) allege that they are imprisoned for actions that are no 
longer deemed criminal due to an intervening Supreme Court decision that 
 
 140. See Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 895 (Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing en 
banc); supra notes 87, 88–90 and accompanying text (discussing § 2255(h)’s ban on multiple 
motions). 
 141. See Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 894–95 (Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing 
en banc) (noting that Wheeler was left with a “conundrum”). 
 142. See id. (noting that Wheeler’s challenge did not involve a constitutional rule); supra 
notes 87, 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 143. These factors are part of § 2255 and bear on the meaning of “inadequate or 
ineffective” under the savings clause. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 144. In such challenges, an inmate argues that, based on an intervening decision, his or her 
conduct does not fulfill the requirements of the crime for which he or she was convicted.  Thus, 
the inmate contests his or her conviction and argues that he or she is not guilty under the law. 
See infra Part II.B.1. 
 145. An inmate bringing this type of challenge contends that due to an intervening decision, 
the original court incorrectly sentenced him. See infra Parts II.B.2–3. 
 146. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 147. See, e.g., Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017); Reyes-Requena v. 
United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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applies retroactively, and (2) have had no prior opportunity to dispute these 
convictions based on the intervening change in precedent.148 
The first prong of this test follows the Supreme Court’s standard for actual 
innocence.  This requires petitioners to show that, based on all evidence 
presented, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted” them.149  Retroactivity is determined in accordance with the 
plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane.150  Under Teague, new cases interpreting 
constitutional issues of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively.151  A 
new rule may only be retroactive if it is substantive152 or a “watershed rule[] 
of criminal procedure.”153  This test’s second prong distinguishes between 
Supreme Court constitutional decisions and statutory interpretation 
decisions.154  Because § 2255 already permits additional motions based on 
new Supreme Court rules of constitutional law, such decisions are not 
sufficient for savings clause relief.155  Therefore, only claims based on 
statutory interpretation decisions may proceed through the savings clause.156 
The Third and Fifth Circuits are unique in that they only permit savings 
clause claims to proceed on a theory of actual innocence.157  However, the 
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which this Note discusses in the 
following two sections, also allow savings clause challenges to 
convictions.158  As the Third Circuit observed, permitting challenges to 
underlying convictions avoids the “thorny constitutional issue” that would 
arise if an inmate continued to be incarcerated despite statutory case law 
 
 148. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 
2013)); Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904 (explaining that the second prong is met where the 
petitioner’s claim was foreclosed by circuit precedent at earlier times when it could have been 
raised).  Gary Bruce’s argument based on Fowler is an example. See supra notes 20–24, 31–
36 and accompanying text.  If Gary had been able to show that, based on all the evidence, it 
was more likely than not that the victims would not have communicated with federal officials 
as required for witness-tampering murder, he may have prevailed. See supra note 34. 
 149. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 184 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). 
 150. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 151. Id. at 310. 
 152. Id. at 307 (describing a substantive rule as one that makes “certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring))). 
 153. Id. at 311 (stating that a new rule of criminal procedure is one that “requires the 
observance of ‘those procedures that . . . are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”’” 
(quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693–94 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 154. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904–05 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 155. See id. 
 156. Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2017); Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 
904–05. 
 157. See, e.g., Bruce, 868 F.3d at 177; Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904. 
 158. See, e.g., Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (observing that the 
Seventh Circuit has gone further than its prior holdings, which were limited to actual 
innocence); Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that the Sixth 
Circuit’s actual innocence standard stems from Bousley and, before the Sixth Circuit allowed 
challenges to convictions, this was the only way to obtain savings clause relief in the circuit); 
In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (establishing the Fourth Circuit’s test for 
actual innocence savings clause claims). 
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establishing his or her innocence.159  Importantly, though, the Fourth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Circuits take a broader view and also entertain challenges to 
sentences. 
2.  The Sixth and Seventh Circuits Also Permit Petitioners to Dispute 
Their Sentences Through the Savings Clause 
Besides viewing the savings clause as permitting relief for challenges to 
convictions, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits espouse the same test for inmates 
who seek to use the savings clause to challenge their sentences.160  On such 
claims, petitioners must demonstrate that they are relying on:  (1) a case 
involving a statutory interpretation dispute (2) that is retroactive and could 
not have been raised in their first § 2255 motions and (3) that “the misapplied 
sentence presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of 
justice or a fundamental defect.”161  The Seventh Circuit first drew this 
conclusion from a textualist approach in Brown v. Caraway162 and the Sixth 
Circuit later followed in Hill v. Masters.163  Both averred that savings clause 
petitioners can have a plausible claim for collateral relief by disputing the 
validity of their detentions without showing that they are innocent of their 
underlying convictions.164  Thus, in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the 
savings clause can be invoked without proving actual innocence.165 
Notably, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits did not seem to foresee this 
interpretation applying broadly.  The Sixth Circuit believed that its test would 
be limited to a small portion of petitioners.166  While both circuits adopted 
the test as described above, they also referred to another consideration—the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).167  The Sixth Circuit stated that 
only prisoners who were sentenced under the Guidelines before United States 
v. Booker,168 which rendered them advisory as opposed to mandatory, could 
 
 159. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 179. 
 160. Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2016); accord Brown v. Caraway, 719 
F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 161. Hill, 836 F.3d at 595; accord Brown, 719 F.3d at 586.  For example, Hill claimed the 
following:  First, in Descamps v. United States, 576 U.S. 254 (2013), the Supreme Court 
arguably restricted how courts determine if a state crime is a “violent felon[y]” that enhances 
a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Hill, 836 F.3d at 595.  Based on Descamps, 
the Fourth Circuit later determined that one of Hill’s predicate offenses, which enhanced his 
sentence, was not a violent felony. Id. at 595–96.  Second, the government conceded that the 
statutory interpretation decision in Descamps and the subsequent Fourth Circuit case applied 
retroactively. Id. at 595–96.  Since they were not constitutional decisions, prisoners could not 
raise these cases in second or successive motions under § 2255(h). Id.  Third, the court 
erroneously subjected Hill to a sentencing enhancement, and so he argued that his misapplied 
sentence under the Guidelines was a “fundamental error.” Id. 
 162. 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 163. Hill, 836 F.3d at 599; Brown, 719 F.3d at 588. 
 164. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 598; Brown, 719 F.3d at 588. 
 165. Hill, 836 F.3d at 595; Brown, 719 F.3d at 586 (departing from other circuits’ 
interpretations, including that of the Fifth Circuit, which requires actual innocence). 
 166. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 599–600. 
 167. Id.; Brown, 719 F.3d at 588. 
 168. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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challenge their sentences through the savings clause.169  The Seventh Circuit 
similarly said that “a petitioner may utilize the savings clause to challenge 
the misapplication of the career offender Guideline, at least where, as here, 
the defendant was sentenced in the pre-Booker era.”170 
In Hill, the Sixth Circuit also supported its holding with Judge Robert 
Gregory’s dissenting opinion in the since-vacated Fourth Circuit case written 
by Judge Agee, United States v. Surratt.171  The court compared Hill and 
Brown to Surratt, noting, “Serving a sentence imposed under mandatory 
guidelines (subsequently lowered by retroactive Supreme Court precedent) 
shares similarities with serving a sentence imposed above the statutory 
maximum.  Both sentences are beyond what is called for by law . . . and both 
raise a fundamental fairness issue.”172  Therefore, these circuits seem to 
permit a prisoner to challenge his or her sentence under the savings clause 
based on retroactively applicable statutory precedent if the sentence:  
(1) exceeds the statutory maximum; or (2) was imposed under mandatory 
Guidelines subsequently made noncompulsory, regardless of whether the 
sentence was above or below the statutory maximum.173 
3.  The Fourth Circuit’s Recent Expansion of the Savings Clause 
Also Encompasses Sentence-Based Challenges 
In March 2018, the Fourth Circuit reconsidered and revised its 
interpretation of § 2255(e) in United States v. Wheeler.174  Despite previously 
limiting savings clause petitions to actual innocence claims, the Fourth 
Circuit adopted a more expansive savings clause test in Wheeler.175  In 
October 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.176 
In 2008, the Western District of North Carolina sentenced Gerald Wheeler 
to ten years’ imprisonment.177  Due to Wheeler’s 1996 felony conviction, the 
Guidelines mandated an enhanced sentence of ten years to life.178  At 
sentencing, the court expressed its dissatisfaction with the mandatory 
sentencing restrictions, remarking, “[T]he sentence that is required to be 
imposed upon you is a harsh sentence.  It’s a mandatory minimum sentence.  
I don’t have any discretion in that area.”179 
 
 169. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 599–600. 
 170. Brown, 719 F.3d at 588. 
 171. 797 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated as moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 172. Hill, 836 F.3d at 599. 
 173. See id. at 599–600; accord Brown, 719 F.3d at 587. 
 174. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018). 
 175. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) 
(Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (noting that the Third 
and Fifth Circuits’ actual-innocence standard is consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s prior case 
law, which only permitted savings clause challenges to convictions). 
 176. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40. 
 177. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 419. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 420. 
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Wheeler’s subsequent savings clause petition relied on United States v. 
Simmons,180 which was decided in 2011.181  Under Simmons, which the 
Fourth Circuit determined applied retroactively, Wheeler’s 1996 conviction 
was not a felony drug offense.182  Consequently, Wheeler did not qualify for 
a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines.183  Absent this 
enhancement, Wheeler would have faced a Guidelines range of seventy to 
eighty-seven months and a statutory range of five to forty years in prison, 
which is a significant difference from the range under which he was 
sentenced in 2008.184  In permitting Wheeler to dispute his sentence, the 
Fourth Circuit set the following parameters:  (1) “at the time of sentencing, 
settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the 
sentence;” (2) the law changed after the prisoner appealed and filed an initial 
§ 2255 motion and this change applies retroactively; (3) the prisoner cannot 
fulfill § 2255(h)(2)’s requirements for second or successive motions; and 
(4) the retroactive change caused a mistake in sentencing that is “sufficiently 
grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.”185 
The Fourth Circuit justified extending the savings clause to sentence 
challenges by reasoning that prisoners would otherwise have no way to 
rectify “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice.”186  The Wheeler majority also cited Sixth and 
Seventh Circuit precedent to support its test,187 though this later generated 
pushback.188  The court specifically relied on Hill and Brown for the premise 
that a mistake in sentencing could qualify as a fundamental defect even if the 
sentence imposed did not surpass the legal maximum.189  This rule was 
instrumental in Wheeler’s case because, even applying Simmons,190 he could 
be resentenced to the same ten-year term under the statutory range.191  
However, after Wheeler, Judge Agee cast doubt on this interpretation.192  
Judge Agee disputed the Wheeler majority’s characterization of Hill and 
 
 180. 635 F.3d 140 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 181. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 421 (citing Simmons, 635 F.3d 140). 
 182. Id. (explaining that Simmons was made retroactive in Miller v. United States, 735 F.3d 
141 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 420; see supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
 185. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429. 
 186. Id. at 428 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). 
 187. Id. at 429, 432. 
 188. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee, 
J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
 189. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 433 (“Thus, like the Seventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also 
recognizes the fundamental significance of a proper sentencing range.  We agree with our 
sister circuits’ view . . . .”). 
 190. Under Simmons, Wheeler’s 1996 conviction was not a predicate offense warranting a 
sentencing enhancement. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 191. While the district court’s stated dissatisfaction with the Guidelines makes the ten-year 
sentence unlikely, Wheeler could have received up to forty years regardless. See Wheeler, 886 
F.3d at 420. 
 192. See Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc) (questioning the majority’s approach and calling on the Supreme Court to 
review this issue). 
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Brown and claimed that the Fourth Circuit adopted the broadest interpretation 
of the savings clause and “fundamental defect.”193  He argued that, contrary 
to the majority opinion, savings clause sentence challenges are only viable in 
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits if prisoners will be imprisoned for a period 
longer than Congress has authorized.194 
Judge Agee’s argument highlights what Fourth Circuit Judge Stephanie 
Thacker characterized as a legal “conundrum.”195  Though Wheeler could 
receive the exact same punishment on remand, the intervening change in law 
is significant because his sentence no longer reflects a statutorily mandated 
minimum.196  Judges Agee and Thacker disagree over the proper reading of 
Brown and Hill and whether the petitioners in those cases were originally 
sentenced below or above the statutory maximum.197  Accordingly, there is 
a dilemma regarding whether claims like Wheeler’s would indeed be 
foreclosed under the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ test.198 
III.  AN IMPERATIVE INTERPRETATION:  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT CONSTRUING THE SAVINGS CLAUSE EXPANSIVELY 
The courts of appeals’ distinct interpretations of the savings clause present 
a puzzling circuit split that prejudices inmates detained in certain locations.  
As Third Circuit Judge D. Michael Fisher noted, “[B]y enacting § 2255[,] 
Congress sought to alleviate the inefficiencies [of § 2241] . . . .  Now those 
difficulties have returned, though in a new form.  And so they will remain, at 
least until Congress or the Supreme Court speaks on the matter.”199  The 
circuits’ conflicting interpretations have transformed the savings clause into 
an inefficient provision due to the disparate and unpredictable results it 
creates for inmates.200  Currently, some prisoners may invoke new case law 
for potential release, while others imprisoned in different circuits will remain 
incarcerated without review.201 
Furthermore, prisoners have no “constitutional right to counsel when 
mounting collateral attacks.”202  Thus, most habeas petitions are filed by pro 
 
 193. Id. (observing that the majority “relies on these cases in error”).  But see Wheeler, 886 
F.3d at 433 (stating that it agrees with the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits, which hold that “a 
sentencing error need not result in a sentence that exceeds statutory limits in order to be a 
fundamental defect”). 
 194. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc). 
 195. Id. at 894 (Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing en banc). 
 196. See id. at 894–95 (observing the difficulties Wheeler faced to challenge the legality of 
his detention where a court sentenced him under an erroneous mandatory minimum). 
 197. Compare id. at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en 
banc), with Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 432.  For further discussion see infra Part IV.B. 
 198. Compare Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of 
petition for rehearing en banc), with Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 433. 
 199. See Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 200. See infra Part III.B. 
 201. See supra Part II. 
 202. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“Our cases establish that the 
right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”). 
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se litigants.203  The uncertainty surrounding the savings clause’s scope makes 
collateral review even more challenging for prisoners to navigate.  For this 
reason, Judge Agee also implored the Supreme Court to consider this issue 
as soon as possible.204  Agee observed that a prompt Supreme Court decision 
would ensure “that the federal courts, Congress, the Bar, and the public will 
have the benefit of clear guidance and consistent results in this important area 
of law.”205 
Agreeing with the government, which filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
in Wheeler, and Judges Agee and Fisher, this Part argues that the Supreme 
Court must decisively interpret the savings clause.  Though Judge Fisher is 
correct that Congress could remedy the savings clause dispute, parties on 
both sides concur that a legislative solution is unlikely.206  Accordingly, the 
Court should grant certiorari in a case that presents this issue.  Importantly, 
the most likely candidate for Supreme Court review at the moment, Wheeler, 
does not squarely present the issue.207  Wheeler focuses on savings clause 
challenges to sentences rather than convictions.208  In 2017, the Court denied 
certiorari in McCarthan and declined to review the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal 
to extend savings clause relief under either theory.209  Given the circuit split’s 
recent expansion,210 the Court should grant certiorari in Wheeler.  However, 
if the Supreme Court finds that Wheeler is not a suitable vehicle for review 
or if the case becomes moot,211 the Court should grant certiorari upon 
receiving a viable petition addressing this issue. 
 
 203. Jude Obasi Nkama, Note, The Great Writ Encumbered by Great Limitations:  Is the 
Third Circuit’s Notice Requirement for Habeas Relief a Structural Bias Against “Persons in 
Custody?,” 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 184 (2001). 
 204. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 894 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc).  In October 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in 
Wheeler. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40.  In this petition, the 
Solicitor General urges the Supreme Court to adopt the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
interpretation—a position that the government had only recently embraced.  The government 
argues that the Supreme Court should prohibit savings clause challenges for intervening 
retroactive changes in case law. See id. at 13.  In November, Wheeler’s counsel waived his 
right to reply to the petition. Waiver of Right to Respond for Respondent, United States v. 
Wheeler, No. 18-420 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018).  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court requested a reply 
brief from Wheeler. Response Requested, United States v. Wheeler, No. 18-420 (U.S. Nov. 
13, 2018).  On January 14, 2019, Wheeler’s counsel filed a reply brief opposing the petition. 
Brief in Opposition, United States v. Wheeler, No. 18-420 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2019). 
 205. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 894 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc). 
 206. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13 (arguing that “[o]nly [the 
Supreme] Court’s intervention can provide the necessary clarity” in the government’s petition 
for certiorari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 26 (observing the 
“unlikelihood of congressional intervention” in a prisoner’s petition for certiorari). 
 207. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 208. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 209. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at I (stating that the question 
presented involves whether a petitioner can use the savings clause to bring a habeas petition 
“to raise a claim that his conviction or sentence is invalid under an intervening and 
retroactively applicable statutory-interpretation decision of this Court” (emphasis added)). 
 210. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 211. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee, 
J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (recognizing “the potential 
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This Note posits that the Court must preserve both avenues of savings 
clause relief—sentences and convictions.  While Congress has not directly 
addressed the circuits’ divergent interpretations of the savings clause, broad 
savings clause relief aligns with its recent interest in criminal justice 
initiatives.212  The Supreme Court’s final interpretation of § 2255(e)’s scope 
is necessary to reduce arbitrariness and legal and judicial inefficiencies.  
Moreover, the savings clause presents a recurring and fundamental issue that 
mandates the Court’s intervention. 
A.  The Circuit Split Fosters Arbitrariness for Prisoners 
Together, venue requirements and contradictory interpretations of the 
savings clause create a predicament for habeas petitioners.213  As discussed 
above, parties must file § 2241 habeas petitions in the district where they are 
imprisoned, not the district that convicted and sentenced them.214  Inmates 
are assigned to prisons based on various factors.215  Once a federal court 
sentences a defendant, it delegates exclusive authority to the Bureau of 
Prisons to determine where the defendant will be imprisoned.216  Generally, 
the Bureau endeavors to incarcerate defendants in a prison located within a 
500-mile radius of their homes, but such placements are not guaranteed.217  
Furthermore, even when defendants are imprisoned within this radius, there 
is no assurance that the prison is necessarily located within the circuit of their 
initial convictions.218 
Since neither prisoners nor courts control where inmates are sent, inmates 
face the possibility of being denied an opportunity that is given to otherwise 
similarly situated prisoners.219  The Bruce cases underscore the potentially 
grave consequences of disjointed interpretations of § 2255(e).220  The Bruces 
committed the same underlying offenses together, were charged with and 
convicted of identical crimes, and sentenced to the same prison terms.221  The 
only fork in the Bruces’ road through the criminal justice system stemmed 
from disparate approaches to the savings clause.222  Though the circuit 
permitting relief ultimately did not rule in Gary Bruce’s favor, offering only 
one brother the opportunity to challenge his detention is problematic in 
 
that the case may become moot if Wheeler is released from incarceration in October 2019, as 
projected,” which caused Judge Agee to decline to poll the Fourth Circuit for rehearing en 
banc to “expedite the path for the Government to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court”). 
 212. See infra notes 255–61 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 214. See supra notes 66, 77 and accompanying text. 
 215. See Designations, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_ 
and_care/designations.jsp [https://perma.cc/QP8G-CB93] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. (stating that if inmates are placed outside this radius, “generally, it is due to specific 
security, programming, or population concerns”). 
 218. See id. (failing to mention a judicial circuit as a consideration in placing inmates). 
 219. See supra notes 1–4, 11–37 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 1–4, 11–37 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 4, 27–37 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
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itself.223  This disparate treatment highlights why “nationwide uniformity as 
to the savings clause’s scope” is desirable and “only [the Supreme] Court’s 
intervention can ensure” it.224 
B.  The Circuit Split Promotes Legal and Judicial Inefficiency 
Parties on both sides of this debate agree that differing interpretations of 
§ 2255(e) contradict, rather than advance, Congress’s purpose in enacting 
this statute.225  After examining the legislative history of § 2255, the 
Supreme Court found no indication of legislative intent to curtail collateral 
remedies.226  Rather, its “sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties 
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in 
another and more convenient forum.”227  This solution, however, is now the 
source of other obstacles for prisoners attempting to rely on the savings 
clause.  Without binding Supreme Court precedent, the government and 
individual circuits may revisit and change their constructions of the savings 
clause whenever they see fit.228  This presents confusion and uncertainty for 
petitioners, judges, and lawyers alike.229 
Over the last twenty years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has changed 
its official construction of the savings clause three times.230  Soon after 
Congress passed the AEDPA in 1996, the DOJ interpreted the clause as 
foreclosing § 2241 habeas petitions even for inmates arguing that new case 
law makes them innocent.231  In 1998, the DOJ shifted its position and 
maintained that prisoners could bring § 2241 petitions under the savings 
clause if, based on a new rule, their sentences either exceeded the statutory 
maximum or were incorrectly calculated from the Guidelines.232  Yet, in the 
DOJ’s McCarthan brief in October 2017, it returned to its initial stance.233  
Later, in its petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler, the DOJ justified this 
shift.234  In this petition, the DOJ noted that “its original interpretation of 
Section 2255(e) was correct, and . . . a contrary reading would be 
insufficiently faithful to the statute’s text and to Congress’s evident purpose 
in limiting the circumstances in which a criminal defendant may file a second 
or successive petition for collateral review.”235 
 
 223. See supra notes 26–36 and accompanying text. 
 224. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 25–26. 
 225. Id. at 13; Constitution Project Brief, supra note 75, at 13. 
 226. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). 
 227. Id. at 219 (emphasis added). 
 228. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 230. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 12, McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) 
(No. 17-85). 
 231. See id.; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 24–25. 
 232. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 230, at 12; Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13. 
 233. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 230, at 11–13. 
 234. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13. 
 235. Id. 
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While the government is certainly entitled to revise its understanding of 
statutes, the latest modification was characterized as uncommon236 and 
“opportunistic.”237  Further, the Fourth Circuit expressed skepticism of the 
government’s reasons for backtracking.238  The court criticized the 
government, stating that its “about-face is particularly distasteful in this case 
wherein [it] cannot identify any principled reason for its turnabout” and 
noting that “[i]t was not until oral argument that the [government] attributed 
this change of position to ‘new leadership in the [DOJ].’”239 
Moreover, the DOJ also reversed course regarding whether the Supreme 
Court should be involved in reviewing the savings clause.240  Just one year 
before the DOJ filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler, it opposed 
certiorari on a savings clause claim in McCarthan.241  In November 2017, 
the DOJ resisted Supreme Court review and indicated that, instead, it was 
developing a legislative solution to resolve the savings clause’s 
ambiguities.242  An expert on collateral review, Professor Leah Litman of the 
University of California Irvine School of Law, described the DOJ’s earlier 
resistance to the Supreme Court’s involvement as “incredibly unseemly” and 
“not a good look.”243  Now, however, the DOJ has changed its tune once 
again—avowing that “[o]nly [the Supreme] Court’s intervention can provide 
the necessary clarity” for the savings clause.244 
Without a conclusive Supreme Court decision, the DOJ can continue 
modifying its position irrespective of its impact on prisoners.  For example, 
the DOJ could easily modify its interpretation whenever it best supports a 
different DOJ policy or a new political party is at the DOJ’s helm.  Before its 
most recent reconsideration, the DOJ invoked its 1998 interpretation in at 
least eleven Supreme Court briefs.245  Furthermore, the DOJ implored the 
Supreme Court to side with its positions on other issues by “leverag[ing] its 
[prior] acceptance of the majority” savings clause standard.246  Thus, future 
modifications to the DOJ’s interpretation of the savings clause would create 
 
 236. See Liptak, supra note 134. 
 237. See Leah Litman & Lark Turner, DOJ Goes Big So Prisoners Can’t Go Home, TAKE 
CARE (Oct. 26, 2017), http://takecareblog.com/blog/doj-goes-big-so-prisoners-can-t-go-home 
[https://perma.cc/8F5X-QGP8]. 
 238. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 434 (4th Cir. 2018) (calling it “curious 
then that the Government chose now—literally in the middle of Appellant’s case—to 
completely change course”), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); see also 
infra Part II.B.1. 
 239. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 434 n.12. 
 240. Compare Liptak, supra note 134 (commenting that the DOJ was considering 
legislative, rather than judicial, solutions), with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
40, at 13 (stating that “[o]nly this Court’s intervention can provide the necessary clarity”). 
 241. Liptak, supra note 134. 
 242. See id. 
 243. Id.; see also Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that “when the 
government changes position on a concededly important question that has divided the circuits, 
it should at least have the courage of its convictions and be willing to defend its new position 
on the merits in this Court”). 
 244. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 245. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3. 
 246. Id. at 5. 
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confusion and cast doubt on other areas of supposedly settled law.  
Furthermore, the statute’s far-reaching and significant implications for 
prisons make stability even more desirable.247 
C.  The Circuit Split Presents a Recurring and Fundamental Issue 
to Prisoners’ Equitable Treatment 
The savings clause’s effect is particularly pronounced because of the 
provision’s relevance to weighty criminal cases.248  Typically, when the 
Supreme Court rejects lower courts’ interpretations of a federal criminal 
statute in favor of a more restrictive one, the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
is retroactively applicable.249  The Supreme Court has issued many such 
decisions over the last decade, but only inmates in certain circuits can 
currently benefit from them.250  Prisoners located in the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits are foreclosed from invoking such retroactive precedent on collateral 
review.251  Consequently, inmates are either detained for activity that is no 
longer criminal or for a term beyond what the law recommends.252  Despite 
these concerns, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in McCarthan and 
refused to take up the issue.253 
The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler only ten 
months after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in McCarthan.254  
However, recent criminal justice reform supports bolstering prisoners’ rights.  
In December 2018, President Trump signed the First Step Act into law.255  
Notably, the First Step Act makes the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
retroactive.256  The Fair Sentencing Act lessened distinctions in sentencing 
for those convicted of crimes involving crack versus powder cocaine.257  
Prisoners convicted before 2010 may only take advantage of the Fair 
Sentencing Act’s retroactivity by petitioning a court.258  Since Congress—
 
 247. See infra Part III.C. 
 248. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 21. 
 249. See id. at 21–22 (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004)). 
 250. See id. at 21. 
 251. See id. at 22, 26. 
 252. Id. at 22. 
 253. Id. at 21 (recognizing the split as “recurring and fundamental to the fairness of the 
criminal justice system”). 
 254. See generally McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 40. 
 255. Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/HZ6T-WPVZ]; Justin George, What’s Really in the First Step Act?, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 16, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2018/11/16/what-s-really-in-the-first-step-act [https://perma.cc/9PBP-K28Z]. 
 256. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222; see also 
George, supra note 255; Charlotte Resing, How the First Step Act Moves Criminal Justice 
Reform Forward, ACLU (Dec. 3, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-
justice/mass-incarceration/how-first-step-act-moves-criminal-justice-reform-forward 
[https://perma.cc/2MRB-MPAA]. 
 257. George, supra note 255; Resing, supra note 256. 
 258. See George, supra note 255.  The First Step Act’s other reforms also expand prisoners’ 
rights, though they are not retroactive. See Resing, supra note 256. 
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rather than a court—made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, inmates can 
seek relief through a motion for imposition of a reduced sentence rather than 
the savings clause.259  Nevertheless, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
estimates that this change will impact 2660 prisoners convicted of crack 
offenses before 2010.260  Jared Kushner, the president’s advisor and son-in-
law, noted that “[f]or all those who are deserving of a second chance, this 
legislation will make a meaningful and measurable difference in their 
lives.”261  This emphasis on granting prisoners a second chance underscores 
the importance of resolving the circuit split in their favor. 
IV.  A DEFINITIVE SAVINGS CLAUSE TEST:  RESOLVING THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT ON § 2255(E) 
The Supreme Court must permit habeas petitioners to challenge their 
sentences or convictions through the savings clause.  First, the Supreme 
Court should explicitly define the savings clause to allow prisoners to bring 
habeas petitions if they claim that intervening retroactive case law either 
renders them actually innocent of their underlying convictions or creates a 
fundamental defect in their sentences.  Second, the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the savings clause is consistent with that of the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits, contrary to the position taken by Judge Agee and the 
DOJ.262  Third, this Note’s expansive approach to the savings clause is 
consistent with the text, history, and purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
A.  A Proposed Solution:  Construing the Savings Clause Broadly 
to Permit Challenges to Convictions and Sentences 
This Note posits that the Supreme Court must construe the savings clause 
to allow prisoners to test the legality of their convictions, as exemplified by 
the Third and Fifth Circuits,263 and their sentences, as permitted in the 
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.264  This Note’s test lessens the current 
savings clause confusion by combining elements from different circuits’ 
 
 259. Soon after President Trump signed the First Step Act, a prisoner named Matthew 
Charles filed a motion for imposition of a reduced sentence. See generally Matthew Charles’s 
Motion for Imposition of a Reduced Sentence Pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act, 
United States v. Charles, No. 3:96-00051 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 27, 2018), ECF No. 251.  The 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the motion and released 
Charles. Order, United States v. Charles, No. 3:96-00051 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2019), ECF No. 
253. 
 260. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING AND PRISON IMPACT ESTIMATE SUMMARY 
S. 756, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 (AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON DEC. 18, 2018) tbl.1 (2018), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/prison-and-sentencing-
impact-assessments/December_2018_Impact_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R6Q-MGC9]; 
see also George, supra note 255; Resing, supra note 256. 
 261. Annie Karni, The Senate Passed the Criminal Justice Bill.  For Jared Kushner, It’s a 
Personal Issue and a Rare Victory., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/12/14/us/politics/jared-kushner-criminal-justice-bill.html [http://perma.cc/5qmj-lug6]. 
 262. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
 263. As discussed earlier, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits similarly allow actual 
innocence challenges. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 264. See supra Part II.B. 
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tests.265  Under the proposed standard, a motion under § 2255 is “inadequate 
or ineffective to test the legality of [a federal prisoner’s] detention”266 where 
the prisoner, who has already exhausted his or her § 2255 remedies, claims 
that a retroactive267 and binding intervening statutory interpretation 
decision268 (1) renders the prisoner “actually innocent” of the underlying 
criminal conviction, or (2) creates a “fundamental defect” in his or her 
sentence.  For purposes of this test, establishing “actual innocence” requires 
petitioners to show that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 
would have convicted” them considering all available evidence.269  A 
subsequent case creates a “fundamental defect” in sentencing if it changes 
the applicable statutory sentencing framework such that a defendant was 
sentenced under an improper sentencing range.  Examples include, but are 
not limited to, cases restricting the factors that a court may consider in 
applying a mandatory sentencing enhancement.270 
Importantly, a “fundamental defect” is not limited to sentences greater than 
the statutory maximum.271  A prisoner may invoke the savings clause even if 
his or her sentence is less than the appropriate statutory ceiling.272  For 
purposes of this test, a “statutory maximum” is the maximum sentence that 
the sentencing court could have imposed with the earlier precedent that is 
now being disputed.273  Thus, this test permits savings clause relief even if a 
sentencing court could have imposed the same sentence absent the 
“fundamental defect.” 
B.  The Fourth Circuit Test Is Equivalent to the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuit Test 
The Wheeler dissent and the government’s conflict with the Wheeler 
majority is grounded in each side’s distinct understandings of the relevant 
statutory maximum.274  Judge Agee and the government contend that the 
 
 265. This Note’s test is most consistent with the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits’ tests, 
which allow challenges to convictions or sentences.  Most cases, however, including the recent 
Wheeler decision, only focus on one type of challenge.  This Note argues that a comprehensive 
standard is ideal to promote judicial efficiency.  While the Supreme Court may decline to 
discuss challenges to underlying convictions if it grants certiorari in Wheeler, this Note’s test 
is intended to fully eliminate the savings clause circuit split. 
 266. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012). 
 267. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 154–56 and accompanying text. 
 269. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 
298, 327 (1995)); see supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 270. One example of such a decision is United States v. Simmons, 635 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 
2011), which was the basis of Wheeler’s claim. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying 
text.  A second example is Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), the basis of 
McCarthan’s claim. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 6–7.  A third 
example is Descamps v. United States, 576 U.S. 254 (2013), which Hill relied on. See supra 
note 161. 
 271. See infra notes 281–95 and accompanying text. 
 272. See infra notes 281–95 and accompanying text. 
 273. See infra notes 281–95 and accompanying text for analysis of “statutory maximum” 
and this definition. 
 274. See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
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Fourth Circuit majority erroneously applied Hill and Brown.275  Accordingly, 
they claim that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits only permit savings clause 
challenges to sentences if they allege “the prisoner is being, or at some point 
will be, detained by the warden beyond the time legally authorized by 
Congress for his offense of conviction.”276  Conversely, the Wheeler 
majority cited precedent from those circuits for the opposite premise.277  
Wheeler identifies the same dispositive statutory maximum as the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits.278 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits agree that the pertinent statutory 
maximum is the one that the original sentencing court should have applied 
given the correction to the maximum established by a subsequent case.279  
Judge Agee and the government instead focus on the maximum sentence the 
original court could have imposed based on its interpretation at the time of 
sentencing, notwithstanding the subsequent correction.280  As discussed 
below, the prior Sixth and Seventh Circuit cases are consistent with the 
Wheeler majority opinion. 
The Seventh Circuit adopted its savings clause test and rationale in Brown 
v. Caraway.281  The District of Delaware originally sentenced Brown to 360 
months in prison.282  The district court erroneously designated Brown as a 
career offender, which subjected him to a then-mandatory Guidelines range 
of 360 months to life in prison rather than 262 to 327 months.283  Thus, 
Brown’s sentence of 360 months was below the statutory maximum due to 
his erroneous career offender label.284  On review, the Seventh Circuit 
focused on the erroneous maximum, not the statutory maximum that should 
have applied had Brown not been incorrectly designated a career offender.285 
Further, Brown quoted Narvaez v. United States286 for the proposition that 
“to ‘increase, dramatically, the point of departure of [the prisoner’s] 
sentence’ . . . is ‘certainly as serious as the most grievous misinformation’” 
 
 275. United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee, J., 
statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 40, at 24–25; see also supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
 276. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc) (emphasis added); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, 
at 24–25. 
 277. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 279. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 432–33 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 587–88 (7th Cir. 
2013); Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 280. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 24–25; see also Wheeler, 734 
F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc) 
(distinguishing between the Fourth Circuit’s approach and that of the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits). 
 281. 719 F.3d at 587–88. 
 282. Id. at 585. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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that has led to habeas relief.287  This language signals that that the Seventh 
Circuit intended to continue granting savings clause review to remedy 
convictions, regardless of the statutory maximum.288  Moreover, the Narvaez 
decision explicitly indicated that a petition could be successful even if a 
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.289 
The Sixth Circuit later adopted the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in Hill 
v. Masters.290  The Hill court stated that Brown’s sentence “did not exceed 
the statutory maximum.”291  Again, this supports the Wheeler majority’s 
emphasis on the erroneous statutory maximum.292  The District of South 
Carolina originally sentenced Hill to 300 months in prison due to his 
inaccurate designation as a career offender, which subjected Hill to a 
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months.293  Hill argued that absent his 
mistaken label as a career offender, he would have been subject to a 
Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months.294  Nevertheless, the court clarified 
that Hill’s sentence fell below the statutory maximum life sentence.295  After 
examining Sixth and Seventh Circuit precedent, the government’s contention 
that these circuits’ decisions were limited to sentences beyond “the 
applicable maximum under a statute or under a mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines regime”296 is inaccurate. 
C.  Evaluating a Broad Construction of the Savings Clause 
Through Its Text, Purpose, and History 
The text, purpose, and history of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 support this Note’s 
proposed construction of the savings clause.  Together, this compels savings 
clause relief for challenges to convictions and sentences.  As amicus curiae 
in McCarthan, the Constitution Project framed the issue as a simple choice 
between antithetical alternatives.297  In passing and later codifying the 
savings clause, Congress either:  (1) created a useless provision that would 
not facilitate its goals, or (2) tried to safeguard prisoners by giving them “a 
meaningful opportunity to raise challenges to the fundamental legality of 
their convictions or sentences that cannot be raised under Section 2255.”298 
 
 287. 719 F.3d at 587–88 (emphasis added) (quoting Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 629). 
 288. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 432–33 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing the 
Seventh Circuit’s savings clause rationale), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 
2018). 
 289. Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 629 (“The fact that Mr. Narvaez’s sentence falls below the 
applicable statutory-maximum sentence is not alone determinative of whether a miscarriage 
of justice has occurred.” (emphasis added)). 
 290. 836 F.3d 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 291. Id. at 597. 
 292. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 433; supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 293. Hill, 836 F.3d at 593. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 596. 
 296. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 24. 
 297. See Constitution Project Brief, supra note 75, at 20. 
 298. Id.  Consistent with this Note’s proposal, the Constitution Project advocated for the 
second option. Id. 
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The phrasing of § 2255(e) neither defines “inadequate or ineffective” nor 
indicates what may qualify as such.299  Thus, courts have largely inferred the 
text’s meaning from other words in the clause.300  The savings clause allows 
habeas petitions if “the court which sentenced [the prisoner] has denied him 
relief” through a § 2255 motion and if the “remedy by motion is inadequate 
or ineffective.”301  Accordingly, courts could refuse relief based on a claim’s 
merits or procedural deficiencies, such as the limit on successive § 2255 
motions.302  However, in Prost v. Anderson,303 Judge Gorsuch focused on 
the distinction between the words “remedy” and “relief.”304 
Judge Gorsuch’s contention that remedy and relief are dissimilar305 is 
overstated.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “remedy” as “[t]he means of 
enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; legal or equitable 
relief.”306  Similarly, it defines “relief” as “[t]he redress or benefit . . . that a 
party asks of a court,” which is “[a]lso termed remedy.”307  Professor Litman 
has noted that federal statutes often use these words in conjunction with each 
other, with a remedy causing relief as its outcome.308  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court itself has used these words interchangeably.309  Thus, 
whether a prisoner obtained relief may be relevant to the question of 
inadequacy or ineffectiveness, even if he or she had access to a § 2255 motion 
as a remedy.310 
The savings clause goes on to state that a prisoner can bring a habeas 
petition if a § 2255 motion “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 
his detention.”311  Both “test” and “legality” shed light on the meaning of 
 
 299. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012). 
 300. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, 
Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1085–95 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Prost v. 
Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–85 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 301. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
 302. Id.; see also Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 
417, 488 (2018). 
 303. 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 304. Id. at 584–85; supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text; see also Litman, supra 
note 302, at 488. 
 305. See Prost, 836 F.3d at 584–85; supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text; see also 
Litman, supra note 302, at 488. 
 306. Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Remedy, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remedy [https://perma.cc/76MX-
RLPQ] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (defining “remedy” as “something that corrects or 
counteracts” or “the legal means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong”). 
 307. Relief, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Relief, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relief [https://perma.cc/ZH8Q-
EPPS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (defining “relief” as “removal or lightening of something 
oppressive, painful, or distressing” or “legal remedy or redress”). 
 308. Litman, supra note 302, at 488. 
 309. Litman, supra note 93, at 74 (“But the Court has used ‘remedy’ to refer to the result a 
plaintiff obtained by filing suit, not just the process applicable to different kinds of lawsuits.”). 
 310. Cf. Litman, supra note 302, at 488 (arguing that “Section 2255(e)’s use of the word 
‘remedy’ does not signify that it is irrelevant whether a prisoner is able to obtain relief under 
Section 2255”).  But see Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–85 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 311. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012). 
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“inadequate or ineffective.”  Yet, “to test” does not command courts to 
disregard relief.312  For example, if a prisoner raises an argument in a § 2255 
motion that prior precedent squarely opposes, that remedy (meaning the 
§ 2255 motion) may not have been an adequate “test.”313 
Moreover, the word “detention” should not be read to exclude challenges 
to convictions or sentences.314  One scholar argues that Congress 
intentionally chose the word “detention” in § 2255(e) as opposed to 
“sentence,” which appears in § 2255(a).315  From this distinction, the author 
posits that the savings clause only allows claims “related to the very act of 
confinement itself.”316  However, prisoners can already challenge that subset 
of claims in § 2241 petitions,317 which renders this reading of the savings 
clause superfluous.  Moreover, prisoners are detained pursuant to their 
convictions and sentences.  Thus, whenever an inmate’s conviction or 
sentence is flawed, “the legality of his detention”318 is called into question. 
Finally, in Prost, Judge Gorsuch relied on structuralism to elucidate the 
savings clause’s text.  Gorsuch argued that the savings clause must foreclose 
relief so that § 2255(h)’s restrictions on multiple motions are not 
undermined.319  He opined that Congress believed that finality should prevail 
and prohibit prisoners from raising the same claims again.320  While this may 
accurately describe Congress’s motive for passing § 2255(h), it does not 
explain the safety net321 that § 2255(e) provides.  Congress enacted § 2255(e) 
nearly fifty years before § 2255(h).322  Construing § 2255(e) based on § 2255 
as a whole “would ‘effectively nullify the gatekeeping provisions’ that 
Congress carefully wrote into that statute.”323  Therefore, the expansive time 
span between these provisions further weakens Gorsuch’s argument that 
§ 2255(e) should be read to comply with § 2255(h).324 
Since the savings clause does not explicitly define “inadequate or 
ineffective,” the purpose and history behind this statute are particularly 
compelling.  Judge Gorsuch erroneously claims that § 2255(e)’s history 
shows that Congress “surely” did not intend for it to allow prisoners to “win 
relief on a meritorious successive motion, or receive multiple bites at the 
 
 312. See Litman, supra note 302, at 488 (arguing that “the word ‘test’” does not “imply a 
limitation on the kinds of claims that can be brought under Section 2255”).  But see Case, 
supra note 105, at 192–93. 
 313. Contra Prost, 636 F.3d at 589. 
 314. But see Case, supra note 105, at 190–92. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 192. 
 317. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 318. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012). 
 319. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 585–86 (10th Cir. 2011); see also supra notes 121–
22 and accompanying text. 
 320. Prost, 636 F.3d at 588. 
 321. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 322. See Litman, supra note 93, at 75. 
 323. Lester v. Flournoy, 909 F.3d 708, 716 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Jones, 226 F.3d 
328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 324. See Litman, supra note 93, at 75. 
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apple.”325  On the contrary, both Congress and the courts have progressively 
extended the scope and availability of collateral review.326 
For § 2255 specifically, Congress’s “purpose and effect . . . was not to 
restrict access to the writ but to make postconviction proceedings more 
efficient.”327  Although the AEDPA somewhat constrained habeas 
procedures, its restrictions largely codified long-standing common-law 
principles.328  Judge Gorsuch relied on a 1952 Supreme Court decision, 
United States v. Hayman,329 to support his claim that Congress did not enact 
the savings clause “to expand or ‘impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral 
attack.’”330  Notably, however, Prost largely neglects Boumediene v. 
Bush,331 in which the Supreme Court clarified that § 2255 and its savings 
clause were “designed to strengthen, rather than dilute, the writ’s 
protections.”332  Strengthening a statute’s efficacy is not incompatible with 
extending prisoners’ rights. 
Furthermore, a broad reading of the savings clause will not compromise 
Congress’s purpose.333  Congress wanted § 2255 to lessen the burden on 
courts located in districts with federal prisons, which were inundated with 
habeas petitions.334  This desire, however, does not mandate keeping 
prisoners incarcerated against the law.335  Though prisoners file habeas 
petitions through the savings clause in the district where they are 
incarcerated, a broad reading of the provision is not a free-for-all.  The 
majority of circuits, and this Note’s proposed test, have restrictive conditions 
that inmates must satisfy.336 
Despite the dearth of legislative history discussing the savings clause’s 
meaning, the historical context surrounding this statute supports this Note’s 
suggested interpretation of the savings clause.337  Though various iterations 
 
 325. Prost, 636 F.3d at 588. 
 326. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 773 (2008); see also Hill v. United States, 
368 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1962). 
 327. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 774–75 (emphasis added); see also Hill, 368 U.S. at 427–
28. 
 328. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text; see also Constitution Project Brief, 
supra note 75, at 3 (“[T]hose restrictions merely codified common law doctrines designed to 
prevent the ‘abuse of the writ’ by sandbagging or repeated relitigation of the same claims.”). 
 329. 342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
 330. Prost, 636 F.3d at 588–89 (quoting Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219). 
 331. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 332. Id. at 776. 
 333. Contra Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 21. 
 334. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 335. Contra McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
40, at 20–21. 
 336. See supra Parts II.B, IV.B. 
 337. See, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that there 
is “nothing in the legislative history explaining” changes to the language in the savings clause 
or what prompted the change); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that “legislative history is uninformative” regarding why Congress created the savings clause 
and that “there is no helpful legislative history” indicating why Congress kept the savings 
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of § 2255 used different language, the provision always provided federal 
prisoners with some access to § 2241.338  In 1943, the first version of this 
bill, entitled “A Bill to Regulate the Review of Judgments of Conviction in 
Certain Criminal Cases,” appeared in the Report of the Judicial Conference 
of Senior Circuit Judges.339  That version of the statute prohibited a prisoner 
from filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “unless it appears that it has 
not been or will not be practicable to have his right to discharge from custody 
determined on such motion because of the necessity of his presence at the 
hearing, or for other reasons.”340  A Senate report in 1948, which considered 
this bill with slightly different language, indicated that the “other reasons” 
would be viewed with significant flexibility.341 
While the Senate passed the aforementioned bill, the House of 
Representatives failed to act.342  Nevertheless, Congress integrated that bill 
into a later version that it approved, albeit with different wording.343  The 
language that Congress first enacted is identical to the current formulation of 
the savings clause.344  Thus, the operative savings clause has always hinged 
on inadequacy or ineffectiveness, which is “broader language” than that of 
earlier proposals.345  Though there is no legislative history conclusively 
delineating the savings clause’s reach, this information signals that Congress 
intended this clause to provide more extensive access to § 2241.  Ultimately, 
a broad construction of the savings clause best conforms to its text, purpose, 
and history. 
D.  Comprehensive and Calculated:  Applying the Savings Clause 
Should the Supreme Court adopt this Note’s test, petitioners such as 
Robert Bruce and Daniel McCarthan would have the opportunity to fully 
dispute their imprisonments.  The Eleventh Circuit, which takes the most 
restrictive approach,346 previously denied both of these petitioners the chance 
to bring habeas petitions through the savings clause.347  Robert Bruce sought 
 
clause after the AEDPA); see also Litman, supra note 93, at 71 (stating that “there is no 
legislative history to suggest” the meaning of “inadequate or ineffective”). 
 338. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1239–41 (discussing various versions of § 2255(e), which 
all reference situations in which a court could entertain a writ of habeas corpus). 
 339. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER SESSION, 1943, at 23 (1943), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1943-09_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M4L-8JXW]. 
 340. Id. at 24 (emphasis added); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 341. See S. REP. NO. 80-1526, at 2 (1948) (noting that there is “a wide discretion in the use 
of habeas corpus where” a motion is unfeasible). 
 342. Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241. 
 343. See id. 
 344. Compare id. at 1241 (quoting the “reworded” savings clause as prohibiting prisoners 
from seeking relief under § 2241 “unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is 
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012) 
(also prohibiting a prisoner from bringing a § 2241 petition “unless it also appears that the 
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention”). 
 345. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra Part II.A. 
 347. See supra notes 28–30, 209 and accompanying text. 
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to dispute his underlying conviction whereas Daniel McCarthan tried to 
challenge his sentence.348 
If Robert Bruce’s petition were to proceed, the outcome would likely 
correspond with the Third Circuit’s decision for his brother, Gary Bruce.349  
On the merits, Robert likely would not be able to show that he is actually 
innocent of witness-tampering murder.350  Yet, the savings clause’s 
significance lies in the opportunity it affords petitioners, irrespective of a 
petition’s ultimate success or rejection.351 
If the Eleventh Circuit were to review McCarthan’s petition, he likely 
would obtain full habeas relief.  In 2003, McCarthan pleaded guilty to being 
a felon in possession of a weapon.352  The prosecution noted that 
McCarthan’s three prior convictions were predicate offenses under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).353  Accordingly, the Middle District 
of Florida sentenced McCarthan to 211 months in prison with five years of 
supervised release.354  The court imposed this sentence based on the 
enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison with five 
years of supervised relief.355  Absent the enhancement, McCarthan’s 
maximum sentence would have been ten years’ imprisonment with three 
years of supervised release.356  After the district court sentenced McCarthan, 
the Supreme Court decided Chambers v. United States,357 which led to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Lee.358  Under Lee, 
McCarthan’s prior offense of walkaway escape is no longer a crime of 
violence and thus not an ACCA predicate offense.359 
McCarthan could not contest his erroneous sentence enhancement because 
he had previously filed a § 2255 motion and the Eleventh Circuit foreclosed 
savings clause relief.360  If, however, the Supreme Court adopted a broad 
reading of the savings clause, McCarthan would have a viable savings clause 
habeas petition.  For example, McCarthan would argue that after he received 
an enhanced ACCA sentence, Lee—which is a retroactive statutory 
decision—disqualified his walkaway escape as a violent felony.  Applying 
Lee, McCarthan would allege the court erroneously enhanced his sentence.  
 
 348. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Bruce v. Warden, 658 F. App’x 935, 937–38 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 683 (2017). 
 349. See Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2017); supra notes 31–32, 34 
and accompanying text. 
 350. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 183, 188–89; supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 352. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
42, at 5. 
 353. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 5. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).  In Chambers, the Supreme Court recognized that certain escapes 
are not violent felonies under the ACCA. Id. at 123, 130. 
 358. 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 359. Id. at 874; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 6. 
 360. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 8–9. 
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Furthermore, McCarthan would note that this is a “fundamental defect” in 
sentencing because his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum without the 
enhancement of seven years’ imprisonment and two years of supervised 
release.  Though McCarthan’s erroneous sentence does exceed the correct 
statutory maximum,361 this Note’s test is not limited to such circumstances.  
As the Fourth Circuit explained, “incorrectly applied sentencing benchmarks 
are fundamentally problematic because they wrongly cabin the district 
court’s discretion to impose a lower sentence when the facts of the crime 
warrant it.”362  In the end, a court would likely find McCarthan’s savings 
clause claim to be meritorious and vacate and remand his case for 
resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, prohibiting prisoners from challenging their detentions when 
a new decision directly invalidates their convictions or sentences contradicts 
the savings clause.  Contrary to Judge Gorsuch’s inapt analogy,363 unlawfully 
incarcerating an individual is wholly different from the consequences that a 
student may face for failing an exam.  Congress enacted § 2255 and its 
savings clause to foster efficiency in U.S. courts, not to curtail prisoners’ 
rights.  Under the guise of judicial restraint, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
have transformed this provision into a hurdle for prisoners.364  Further, the 
discord among the remaining circuits regarding the savings clause’s scope is 
unnecessarily confusing.  All sides to this debate agree that the Supreme 
Court is tasked with interpreting and resolving conflicting interpretations of 
the law.  To be faithful to Congress’s goal in § 2255 of making habeas relief 
more efficient, the Supreme Court must conclusively permit prisoners to 
challenge their sentences or convictions under the savings clause. 
 
 361. See supra notes 354–56 and accompanying text. 
 362. Lester v. Flournoy, 909 F.3d 708, 714 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 363. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 589 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 364. See supra Part II.A. 
